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Chair's Foreword 
 
I am pleased to present the findings of the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life's review 
of the effectiveness of standards regulation in 
England.  
 
The Committee launched this review, Standards 
Matter 2, last autumn to evaluate the strengths 
and weaknesses of the institutions, policies and 
processes that implement ethical standards in 
Westminster and beyond. We have received 
evidence from members of the public, civil 
servants, academia, think tanks, professional 
associations, standards regulators and the 
government. We are grateful to all who have 
contributed so far. 
 
We have found that four areas of standards regulation require significant reform: the 
Ministerial Code and the Independent Adviser on Ministers' Interests, the business 
appointment rules and the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA), 
transparency around lobbying, and the regulation of public appointments.  
 
Though it is unusual for the Committee to publish findings in advance of a final report, our 
system of standards regulation is currently under sustained public scrutiny, and the 
upholding and enforcement of the Seven Principles of Public Life is the subject of a number 
of parliamentary and government inquiries. The Committee is releasing these findings now 
to contribute to that debate in a timely manner. 
 
The Committee's final report will be published later this year, and it will include the 
Committee's assessment of the relevance of the Seven Principles of Public Life, our view on 
how ethical standards are being upheld across public life, and our formal recommendations 
to the Prime Minister. These findings identify immediate issues with the current operation of 
the standards regulatory regime, and point in the direction of necessary reforms.  
 
Selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, and leadership. 
Since their articulation by this Committee 25 years ago, the Seven Principles of Public Life 




Lord Evans of Weardale 
Chair 
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Summary of Findings 
 
The Committee has identified four areas of standards regulation that require reform: the 
Ministerial Code and the Independent Adviser on Ministers' Interests; the business 
appointment rules and the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA); 
transparency around lobbying; and the regulation of public appointments. The Committee's 
findings in each area are as follows.  
 
The Ministerial Code and the Independent Adviser on Ministers' Interests 
 
● The Ministerial Code should be issued by the Prime Minister. 
● There should be a range of graduated sanctions for breaches of the Ministerial Code, 
and the issuing of those sanctions should be a matter solely for the Prime Minister. 
● The Independent Adviser should be able to initiate investigations, determine findings 
of breaches, and a summary of their findings should be published in a timely manner. 
 
The Business Appointment Rules and the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments 
 
● The business appointment rules should be expanded to prohibit for two years 
business appointments where the applicant has significant and direct responsibility 
for policy, regulation, or the awarding of contracts relevant to the hiring company. 
● The government should amend the rules to enable government departments and 
ACOBA to issue a longer ban on lobbying, not exceeding five years, where deemed 
appropriate, and to make clear that applications to work with lobbying firms will not 
be accepted for a specified period of time.  
● The business appointment rules should be made enforceable through employment 
contracts for civil servants and special advisers, and through parallel legal 
arrangements for ministers. Should that prove impossible or impractical then the 
government should explore how a statutory scheme with civil penalties could 
operate.  
● Government departments should publish details on their implementation of the 
business appointment rules, and the Cabinet Office should ensure the application of 
the rules is consistent across all government departments.  
● ACOBA should be given additional resources to promote awareness and 
understanding of the business appointment rules.  
 
Transparency Around Lobbying 
 
● To improve the quality of departmental transparency releases, the Cabinet Office 
should: 
○ collate all departmental transparency releases and publish them in one 
centrally managed database  
○ ensure that a sufficient level of detail is provided on the subject matter of all 
lobbying meetings and any policy matters discussed 
○ ensure that all transparency releases are published in a timely manner on a 
monthly basis 
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○ publish details of meetings held with external organisations by senior civil 
servants below permanent secretary level 
○ publish details of meetings held with external organisations by special 
advisers 
○ update guidance on the use of modern communications, to apply the principle 
that 'government business is government business' to any informal lobbying 
○ revise the categories of published information to close the loophole by which 
informal lobbying is not disclosed in departmental releases 
 
The Regulation of Public Appointments 
 
● Reforms are necessary to the regulation of significant public appointments to ensure 
the Commissioner has sufficient powers to uphold the integrity of the appointments 
process. 
● The appointment process for Non-Executive Directors of government departments 
should be regulated. 
● Government departments should each publish a list of unregulated appointments. 
● The appointment process for standards regulators requires a greater element of 
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Introduction 
 
1. In 1995, Lord Nolan, the first Chair of this Committee, was tasked by the then Prime 
Minister Sir John Major with articulating a shared set of values for all those in public 
life. The Committee produced the Seven Principles of Public Life: Selflessness, 
Integrity, Objectivity, Accountability, Openness, Honesty, and Leadership. These 
principles sought to encapsulate the traditions of public service in the UK and their 
continuing relevance has been repeatedly confirmed in both qualitative and 
quantitative research over the past 25 years. 
 
2. The Nolan Principles are not a personal moral code but a prescriptive set of ethical 
responsibilities that define the meaning and substance of public office. To be elected 
(or appointed) and to take a public salary may place an individual in public office, but 
to fulfil the requirements of that office means an adherence to the ethical precepts 
that underpin it. The Seven Principles define the legitimate use of entrusted power in 
the public sphere.  
 
3. Lord Nolan's original report made clear that the Seven Principles alone would not be 
enough to ensure high standards of conduct in the public sector, and that they would 
need to be supported by three broad mechanisms: codes of conduct, independent 
scrutiny, and education. Codes of conduct translate the Seven Principles into 
context-specific rules; independent regulation and scrutiny ensures those rules are 
enforced and upheld fairly; and education, primarily through guidance, training, and 
induction, inculcates the meaning and application of ethical standards into the culture 
of an organisation.   
 
4. The development of much of the UK's standards architecture has followed Lord 
Nolan's blueprint. Ministers, MPs, peers, civil servants, special advisers, board 
members of public bodies, and a range of public service professionals are now 
covered by codes of conduct based on the Seven Principles. CSPL 
recommendations have played a part in the creation or reform of a range of 
regulatory bodies, including the Independent Adviser on Ministers' Interests, the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, the Commissioner for Public 
Appointments, IPSA, the Electoral Commission, and more. This Committee was 
established to provide independent, cross-party assurance that the arrangements in 
place to regulate and uphold standards in public life are thorough, fair, and free from 
partisan influence.  
 
5. After a quarter century of institutional reform, the standards landscape that exists 
today is complex and intricate. In 2019, to mark 25 years since the establishment of 
CSPL, the Committee commissioned academic research to map this web of rules, 
regulations, and regulators that enforce and uphold the Seven Principles of Public 
Life.1 In September 2020 the Committee launched this review, Standards Matter 2, to 
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6. Having assessed and taken evidence about the effectiveness of standards regulation 
in central government and Parliament, the Committee has found that four areas of 
executive standards regulation require significant reform: the Ministerial Code and 
the Independent Adviser on Ministers' Interests, the business appointment rules and 
the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA), transparency around 
lobbying, and the regulation of public appointments. This report outlines the 
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The Ministerial Code and the Independent Adviser on Ministers' Interests 
 
7. The Committee's interest in the Ministerial Code is longstanding. Lord Nolan's first 
report recommended changes to what was then called Questions of Procedure for 
Ministers (QPM), to draw out more clearly its provisions on ethics and propriety.2 The 
Committee's 6th report called for clarification on the consequences of breaking the 
Code, to make clear that the Prime Minister should be the "ultimate judge of the 
requirements of the Code and the appropriate consequences of breaches of it."3 The 
Committee's 9th report recommended the creation of the post of the Independent 
Adviser, to assist with the upholding of the Code and to refer breaches of the Code to 
the Prime Minister.4 The Committee's 14th report noted controversy over 
inconsistencies in the Prime Minister's use of the Independent Adviser, and voiced 
concern that the Adviser had no independent ability to initiate investigations.5 
 
8. Since the publication of QPM in 1992, successive Prime Ministers and Committees 
have sought to transform what was then general guidance on cabinet governance 
into a modern code of conduct, based on the Seven Principles of Public Life and 
subject to independent advice and scrutiny. The Code has subsequently taken on a 
higher profile in public discourse, setting expectations for ministerial standards and 
acting as a benchmark against which the conduct of ministers is judged. 
 
9. The trend towards greater independence has progressed in line with an important 
constitutional norm: that the Prime Minister has the sole authority to advise the 
Sovereign on the composition of the government. The issuing of the Ministerial Code 
is an integral part of this constitutional role. It outlines the Prime Minister's 
expectations of ministers and the terms under which they serve, defines how 
ministers can meet their individual and collective responsibilities, and lays out for the 
public the standards against which ministers and the government should be held to 
account.  
 
10. The Committee's findings on the Ministerial Code from its 6th report still ring true: "It 
is the Prime Minister's document: he authorises and guides the drafting and 
contributes a personal Foreword to it. In the Foreword, he makes it clear that the 
Code constitutes his guidance on how he expects ministers to behave."6 As former 
Cabinet Secretaries and former Independent Advisers contributing to this review 
made clear, the Code draws its power from the Prime Minister's authorship.  
 
11. It is on this basis that the Committee does not support calls for the Code to be 
drafted or owned by Parliament. The Prime Minister should issue the Code and is 
accountable to Parliament for any decisions he or she makes relating to the Code 
and its implementation. 
 
12. The issue of ownership is, however, distinct from the issues of investigation and 
sanction. Attempts to increase the independence of investigation under multiple 
administrations were constrained by the expectation that any breach of the Ministerial 
Code should lead to the resignation of the offending minister. It is understandable for 
Prime Ministers to want to retain control of powers relating to the independence of 
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investigations when the conclusion of such an investigation could force a ministerial 
resignation. The composition of the government must be a matter solely for the Prime 
Minister, and to create a situation whereby any independent regulator of the 
Ministerial Code would effectively have the power to fire a Minister, would be 
undemocratic and unconstitutional.  
 
13. Such an expectation is also wrong on its own merits. We know of no other area of 
public life where such a binary sanctions system exists. In both Parliament and the 
Civil Service there is a range of graduated sanctions according to the seriousness of 
the offence. There is no reason why this should not be the case for ministers. Many 
breaches of the Code may be minor, inadvertent, or subject to mitigating 
circumstances, though serious breaches of the Ministerial Code should lead to a 
minister's resignation. The appropriate sanction must be a decision for the Prime 
Minister, who is accountable to Parliament and the public.  
 
14. It is for these reasons that the Committee recommended to the Prime Minister in April 
that the Code should be subject to graduated sanctions, and we welcome his 
agreement.7 The Committee will comment on a range of appropriate sanctions in its 
final report this autumn. We are firmly of the view, however, that the implementation 
of graduated sanctions should occur alongside significant improvements in the 
independence of the Adviser, which has been a matter of serious and longstanding 
concern. The introduction of graduated sanctions removes any constitutional 
obstacle to greater independence in the investigatory process.  
 
15. There are three parts of the investigatory process that require greater independence: 
the initiation of investigations, the determination of a breach, and the publication of 
the Adviser's findings. These matters are discussed below. We will return to other 
matters on the Code, including its composition, in our final report. 
 
16. The Committee welcomes the appointment of Lord Geidt as Independent Adviser. 
We were glad to see that the Prime Minister appointed the Adviser for a non-
renewable five-year term and that he will be supported by civil servants reporting 
directly to him, in line with the Committee's recommendations.8 The Committee 
believes the appointment of all future Independent Advisers should be regulated by 
an enhanced version of the current process for significant public appointments (see 
paragraph 92).  
 
The Initiation of Investigations  
 
17. The Independent Adviser currently has no independent ability to initiate 
investigations into breaches of the Code. This lack of independence, combined with 
high profile allegations over the past 12 months that at first look warranted 
investigation, has served to undermine public confidence in the regulation of the 
Ministerial Code. The perception has taken root - fairly or not - that an allegation of a 
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18. Improvements in the independence of investigations in Parliament on bullying, 
harassment, and sexual harassment bring matters under the Ministerial Code into 
sharp relief. On multiple occasions witnesses to this review pointed out that if a 
minister bullied or harassed a parliamentary staffer, the complaint would be subject 
to a fully independent investigation. If the same minister bullied or harassed a civil 
servant, that complaint would not be assessed independently, and may never be 
investigated at all. Polling of FDA members found that 85% of the Senior Civil 
Service and 90% of Fast Streamers had no confidence in the regulation of the 
Ministerial Code.9 This is not a sustainable position.  
 
19. The Committee believes the Independent Adviser's inability to initiate investigations 
independently undermines confidence in the regulation of the Code. This is critical as 
the Ministerial Code serves a dual purpose: it exists not only to ensure the highest 
standards of conduct in government as a matter of procedure, but also to give the 
public confidence that ministers will uphold high standards and will be held to 
account if they do not. Even if, on the former, the Code still operates well, on the 
latter it is clear that current arrangements are not fit for purpose. For these reasons, 
the Chair wrote to the Prime Minister recommending that the Adviser be granted the 
independent authority to initiate investigations.  
 
20. Though this recommendation was not taken forward, the Committee notes the 
provision in the role's new terms of reference for the Independent Adviser to advise 
the Prime Minister confidentially on the initiation of investigations. In his first Annual 
Report, Lord Geidt described the Adviser's new "explicit authority" to advise on 
initiation "an important stiffening of the independence of the post".10  
 
21. It is unclear, however, to what extent this represents a significant change to prior 
arrangements. Sir Alex Allan, the former post-holder, told the Committee that he 
would regularly discuss issues with the Propriety and Ethics team in the Cabinet 
Office, and that he was "not completely sitting back and waiting around". In response 
to a question asking if an accurate description of his role was that "the formal 
initiation comes from the Prime Minister and that's as it must be, but there's the 
possibility for some discussion of the issue before that formal initiation", Sir Alex 
confirmed "Yes".11 Though formalising the Adviser's right to advise confidentially on 
initiation is welcome, it may not represent a substantive improvement in the 
independence of the Adviser, and so there may be little reason to believe that 
concern on the initiation of inquiries will be alleviated by new arrangements.  
 
22. We recognise the risk that granting the Independent Adviser the power to initiate 
investigations could lead to the Adviser being targeted with vexatious, trivial, or 
politically motivated complaints. Currently many such complaints are directed to the 
Cabinet Secretary. As the experience of the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Standards shows, an Independent Adviser, supported by a team of officials, would be 
able to reject unsubstantiated complaints without further investigation.  
 
23. In his evidence to the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee 
(PACAC), Lord Geidt expressed his commitment to making the new terms of 
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reference a success, and to assess their effectiveness after a period of operation 
where the "revivified" terms of reference "are actively deployed".12 The Committee 
still believes that full independence on the initiation of investigations is necessary, 
and we will monitor the impact of the new terms of reference in the coming months, 
prior to our final report this autumn. 
 
The Determination of Breaches  
 
24. Under current arrangements, the Independent Adviser, on examining the facts of a 
case, reports to the Prime Minister on whether or not they believe a minister's actions 
amount to a breach of the Code. It is the Prime Minister, however, who makes the 
final determination on whether or not a breach of the Code has occurred.  
 
25. This two-step process places both the Adviser and the Prime Minister in a difficult 
position when there is a divergence of opinion on the finding of a breach. An Adviser 
whose conclusion of a breach is publicly rejected by the Prime Minister may find 
themselves critically undermined and considering resignation. For the Prime Minister, 
overruling the Adviser on the determination of a breach therefore comes with a 
significant and unwelcome additional political cost. Cases of misconduct are not 
always clear cut, and current arrangements mean that a slight difference of opinion 
may result in disproportionate consequences.  
 
26. In addition, in the eyes of the public, the overruling of an Independent Adviser on the 
determination of a breach undermines the principle of independent scrutiny that Lord 
Nolan identified as so important to the upholding of standards in public life. Should an 
Adviser then subsequently resign, trust in the regulation of the Ministerial Code falls 
further. 
 
27. Where any finding of a breach would lead to the expectation of a minister's 
resignation, it is understandable that the Prime Minister would want to retain the 
ultimate authority to declare a breach of the Code. But the introduction of graduated 
sanctions means that the Committee sees no reason why the Adviser's determination 
of a breach cannot be final. By granting the Adviser the authority to determine a 
finding of a breach, whilst asserting the Prime Minister's right to choose from a range 
of sanctions for that breach, the Prime Minister's right to determine the composition 
of their cabinet is protected, and the integrity of the independent regulation of the 
Code is upheld.  
 
The Publication of the Adviser's Findings 
 
28. Concerns had been raised in the course of evidence gathering that the publication of 
the Adviser's conclusions could be withheld or delayed. A lack of openness or 
timeliness risks fuelling perceptions that the Ministerial Code can be manipulated for 
political gain.  
 
29. To ensure the highest degree of transparency around the Code, the Committee 
recommended that the Adviser be able to publish their own findings. A summary of 
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the Adviser's findings should be published alongside the Prime Minister’s decision on 
sanctions. (We advise publishing a summary only given that evidence is usually 
contributed in confidence.) We welcome the Prime Minister's commitment that the 
Adviser's findings will be published in a timely manner.  
 
The Committee's Findings:  
● The Ministerial Code should be issued by the Prime Minister. 
● There should be a range of graduated sanctions for breaches of the Ministerial 
Code, and the issuing of those sanctions should be a matter solely for the Prime 
Minister. 
● The Independent Adviser should be able to initiate investigations, determine 





Selflessness | Integrity | Objectivity | Accountability | Openness | Honesty | Leadership 
The Business Appointment Rules and the Advisory Committee on Business 
Appointments (ACOBA) 
 
30. The sharing of expertise between government and the commercial world improves 
the effectiveness and efficiency of both. Ministers and civil servants have a right to 
pursue or return to previous careers in the private sector after leaving public office, 
and interchange between the public and private sectors has been encouraged by 
successive governments.  
 
31. It is equally important to recognise, however, that the privileges and obligations of 
public service distinguish employment in government from working for a private 
company, and that consideration of potential conflicts of interest is necessary when 
regulating movement from the public to the private sector.  
 
32. The government's business appointment rules regulate the employment of ministers, 
civil servants and special advisers after they leave public office. The rules allow 
government departments (or for the most senior cases, ACOBA), to apply delays, 
conditions, and restrictions on private sector employment, or to advise that a 
proposed appointment is unsuitable. The rules apply for either one or two years after 
leaving public office, depending on the seniority of the applicant or the nature of their 
work. The rules include a "general principle" of a two year ban on lobbying. The 
purpose of the rules is to avoid:  
 
- any suspicion that an appointment might be a reward for past favours 
- the risk that an employer might gain an improper advantage by appointing a 
former official who holds information about its competitors, or about 
impending government policy 
- the risk of a former official or minister improperly exploiting privileged access 
to contacts in government 13 
 
33. For civil servants and members of the armed forces, the business appointment rules 
have been in place since the 1970s. Ministers were first made subject to the rules on 
the recommendation of CSPL’s first report in 1995.14 Though many aspects of the 
rules have since been reformed, the institutional architecture of the business 
appointment rules is broadly similar today to 25 years ago: the rules are issued and 
owned by government, are non-statutory, advisory, and administered by the 
independent Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA) in the most 
senior cases.  
 
34. Yet the context in which the business appointment rules operate has changed in two 
important aspects. First, there is now significantly greater interchange between the 
public and private sectors. In 1995, Lord Nolan noted evidence arguing that "in most 
cases, senior civil servants will leave public service at a retirement age which is 
known in advance, and that on departure most will receive a full pension."15 Today, 
senior civil servants (and ministers) leave public office younger, and it is much more 
common for individuals to have careers which regularly move between the public and 
private sectors.  
13 
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35. Second, government outsourcing today is significantly higher than it was 25 years 
ago. According to the Institute for Government, around one third of public 
expenditure is now spent on buying goods and services from external suppliers, with 
a fifth of that spending going to 'strategic suppliers' who receive over £100m in 
revenue from government.16 As outsourcing increases, so does the risk that private 
companies may seek to gain favour through a business appointment.  
 
36. These increased risks around business appointments, alongside criticism of the ways 
in which the rules are currently enforced, have resulted in widespread discontent 
around the current operation of the business appointment rules. In the evidence we 
took, criticism of the current application of the rules was unanimous. There are four 
issues where reform is necessary: the scope of the rules; the two year ban on 
lobbying; the lack of any investigation, enforcement and sanctions around the rules; 
and the application of the rules at departmental level. 
 
The Scope of the Business Appointment Rules 
 
37. As currently written, the business appointment rules are framed to focus on any 
direct regulatory, policy, or commercial relationship between the applicant and the 
hiring company. Such a framing targets the most obvious risk of corruption: that a 
minister or civil servant took a specific decision to favour a private company in 
anticipation of future reward.  
 
38. The Committee's evidence raised concerns that such a framing may be too narrow. 
Contributors emphasised the risk to public trust when former ministers and civil 
servants take up private sector appointments in the sectors where they had broad 
regulatory and commercial responsibility, even where there is no direct relationship 
between a former office-holder and the hiring company. We were told that the 
perception of probity could be undermined in cases where, for example, former 
housing ministers go to work for construction companies, or former senior civil 
servants at the Department for Transport go to work for rail companies.  
 
39. Such perceptions must be balanced against the fact that the government's business 
appointment rules exist to regulate conflicts of interest, and actively encourage the 
interchange between government and business. A significant expansion in the scope 
of the business appointment rules would undoubtedly hinder beneficial interchange 
between the public and private sector, and could lead to a requirement to pay former 
public office holders for significant periods of gardening leave, where office holders 
are paid for a certain period despite leaving their role, as they are prohibited from 
taking other paid employment.  
 
40. PACAC has previously recommended that the rules should include "a clearly defined 
principle that at a minimum, public servants should avoid taking up appointments 
within a two year time period that relate directly to their previous areas of policy and 
responsibility when they have had direct regulatory or contractual authority within a 
particular sector."17 Lord Pickles, Chair of ACOBA, wrote that "consideration should 
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be given to making it explicit in the rules, and in employment contracts, that it is not 
appropriate for individuals to work in areas they have had direct regulatory, 
commercial or contractual responsibilities."18  
 
41. The Committee agrees with PACAC and Lord Pickles that the scope of the rules 
should be expanded. Conflicts of interest are not just the product of a relationship 
between an official and a specific future employer. An official may institute policy or 
regulation sympathetic to a range of companies providing a particular service or 
product, with an eye to future employment, without having a direct relationship with 
any specific company. The rules should not be so broad, however, as to prohibit the 
employment of a minister or official by a company with whom they have had no direct 
relationship and only tangential or incidental engagement with the relevant policy 
area. The Committee therefore proposes that the rules be expanded to prohibit for 
two years business appointments where the applicant has significant and direct 
responsibility for policy, regulation, or the awarding of contracts relevant to the hiring 
company. 
 
42. A second issue concerns the need for former ministers and senior civil servants to 
seek ACOBA approval for unpaid or low-risk roles. Unpaid roles, or roles in the public 
sector or academia, generally pose less of a threat to the integrity of government 
than private sector roles. The Committee welcomes Lord Pickles' proposals to apply 
a more proportionate, risk-based approach to "offer prompt, predictable and 
consistent advice" on such cases.19  
 
The Two Year Ban on Lobbying 
 
43. Lobbying on behalf of commercial interests poses a significant risk to public 
perceptions of the integrity of government where it appears that former office holders 
are trading on their time in office. The Seven Principles of Public Life are undermined 
when former officials use contacts made in government to provide privileged access 
for a private sector company in return for financial reward, particularly when such 
lobbying is not transparent.  
 
44. In light of those risks, the two year ban may be too short in some cases. Government 
departments and ACOBA should be able to issue a lobbying ban for a longer period 
of up to five years where they deem it appropriate. Whether or not a longer ban is 
warranted will depend on the nature of the position held by an applicant in 
government. If an applicant had a particularly senior role, or where contacts made or 
privileged information received will remain relevant after two years, a longer ban may 
be necessary to ensure that former officials lobbying government are not directly 
benefiting from their time in office when they do so. Any longer ban should be applied 
proportionately and should not become the default option.  
 
45. In his oral evidence to the Committee, Lord Pickles also highlighted the issue of 
officials joining lobbying companies whilst claiming not to be undertaking any 
lobbying. It is reasonable to view such claims with scepticism, and the Committee 
agrees with Lord Pickles that the government should amend the rules to make clear 
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"that applications to work with lobbying firms will not be accepted for a certain period 
of time".20 The Committee will consider the practical and legal issues around 
extending and strengthening the lobbying ban in its final report.  
 
Lack of any investigation, enforcement, and sanctions capacity 
 
46. Lord Pickles' evidence to this review was clear: "there are no sanctions" for breaches 
of the business appointment rules. It is for this reason that "ACOBA is not a regulator 
nor a watchdog".21 The rules, which are owned by the government, specify that 
ACOBA's role is solely to advise applicants on whether proposed appointments are in 
line with the rules. For civil servants below the most senior levels, such advice is 
provided by government departments.    
 
47. In lieu of any formal sanctions, transparency has become the primary mechanism by 
which the rules are enforced at senior levels. Public letters from the Chair of ACOBA 
may pressure applicants and prospective employers into compliance with the rules, 
creating what the government terms "moral and reputational pressure on people 
leaving public office."22 Such pressure may be significant, and in most cases, enough 
to ensure compliance. Lord Pickles was clear that compliance with the rules is, to the 
extent of ACOBA's knowledge, very high. 
 
48. The effectiveness of transparency at ensuring compliance does not make up for the 
fact that there are no sanctions for office holders who break the government's rules. 
Media scrutiny may cause an office holder reputational damage, but it does not 
constitute a government-issued sanction for a breach of the government's own rules. 
The public credibility of any regulatory scheme depends on a visible range of 
sanctions, but neither ACOBA nor government departments can issue any. 
 
49. There are additional problems with relying on transparency alone as a means of 
ensuring compliance with the business appointment rules. The most important of 
these is the fact that under current arrangements, transparency undermines not only 
the reputation of the individual accused of breaching the rules but also the reputation 
of ACOBA itself, as well as the credibility of the business appointments scheme. As 
one contributor told the Committee, the louder ACOBA's bark, the more evident it is 
that it has no bite.  
 
50. This is compounded by the fact that compliance with the rules is less visible than 
breaches of the rules. ACOBA does not publish correspondence where applicants 
have complied with either formal or informal advice that an appointment is unsuitable, 
as ACOBA must be able to provide confidential advice to applicants unsure about the 
propriety of an appointment who want to consult with the Committee. However, this 
means that the net effect of the government's transparency-only approach to 
enforcing the rules is a series of media stories highlighting breaches of the rules and 
a lack of sanction for those doing so, whilst ACOBA's impact on inappropriate 
business appointments not being taken up is less visible. ACOBA publishes 
aggregate figures of applications not taken up or withdrawn in its Annual Report, but 
these figures receive limited media coverage.  
16 
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51. No system of ethical regulation can sustain the trust of the public, or those it is meant 
to regulate, when its primary method of enforcement serves only to highlight 
unsanctioned breaches whilst compliance goes unnoticed. On this basis, the 
Committee believes that transparency alone is not an adequate means of enforcing 
the business appointment rules. 
 
52. The government is working with the ACOBA Chair to integrate breaches of the rules 
into the honours and appointments processes, including for the House of Lords. Such 
a move is welcome. However, these reforms are unlikely to resolve the issues of 
public trust outlined above. Lord Pickles made clear to this Committee that any 
consideration of breaches in the honours and appointments processes will not bind 
the Prime Minister's powers of patronage, and the public is unlikely to see the 
possible future non-receipt of an honour, peerage, or public appointment as a 
genuine or serious sanction for a breach of the rules. These improvements therefore 
fall short of introducing a formal and credible sanctions regime. 
 
53. An alternative or additional option would be to ensure compliance through writing the 
business appointment rules into relevant employment contracts. Lord Pickles argues 
that "It should be an explicit post-employment contractual obligation to adhere to the 
Government's rules and make clear what the sanction will be."23 The Committee 
agrees. By writing the business appointment rules into employment contracts for civil 
servants and special advisers, and instituting parallel legal arrangements for 
ministers, it will be clear to those taking up public office what the government's 
expectations are of any post-employment activity. Such contractual and legal 
requirements should be binding, taking into account any restraint of trade 
considerations.  
 
54. In the event that legal or commercial issues prevent the enforcement of the business 
appointment rules through employment contracts, the government should explore 
how a statutory business appointments scheme with civil penalties could operate. 
Relying on transparency alone, or the honours and appointments reforms suggested, 
will not introduce a sanctions regime strong enough to restore public trust in the 
regulation of business appointments. The widespread perception that breaches of the 
government's business appointment rules go unpunished undermines the credibility 
of the regulatory regime, regardless of how high compliance is in practice.  
 
The Application of the Rules at Departmental Level 
 
55. A serious area of concern shared by both Lord Pickles and the Committee concerns 
the enforcement of the business appointment rules in government departments, 
below ACOBA level. Lord Pickles characterised the approach of some departments 
as "slapdash" and "verging on negligent", whilst praising the approach of others. We 
agree with Lord Pickles' assessment that a "predatory company" would target those 
below ACOBA level, particularly civil service directors and deputy directors.24 The 
risk posed by business appointments in less senior roles is therefore significant.  
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56. We are pleased that the Cabinet Office is working with other government 
departments to trial changes to off-boarding processes, as well as improvements in 
reporting to audit and risk committees. However the lack of transparency in how 
departments are implementing the business appointment rules prohibits any 
meaningful scrutiny. At a minimum, departments should publish more information on 
how they implement the rules, as well as anonymised and aggregated data on how 
many applications under the rules are submitted, approved, or rejected every year. In 
the longer term, the Cabinet Office should ensure that the application of the rules is 
consistent across all government departments. 
 
57. Similarly, the government should take up Lord Pickles' suggestion that ACOBA could 
"share best practice, raise awareness and transparency on the rules" across 
government departments.25 A useful model to replicate here would be the work of the 
Civil Service Commission, which holds events to promote awareness and 
understanding of the Civil Service Code, which is also implemented by government 
departments in the first instance. 
 
The Committee's Findings:  
● The business appointment rules should be expanded to prohibit for two years 
business appointments where the applicant has significant and direct responsibility 
for policy, regulation, or the awarding of contracts relevant to the hiring company. 
● The government should amend the rules to enable government departments and 
ACOBA to  issue a longer ban on lobbying, not exceeding five years, where 
deemed appropriate, and to make clear that applications to work with lobbying 
firms will not be accepted for a specified period of time.  
● The business appointment rules should be made enforceable through employment 
contracts for civil servants and special advisers, and through parallel legal 
arrangements for ministers. Should that prove impossible or impractical then the 
government should explore how a statutory scheme with civil penalties could 
operate.  
● Government departments should publish details on their implementation of the 
business appointment rules, and the Cabinet Office should ensure the application 
of the rules is consistent across all government departments.  
● ACOBA should be given additional resources to promote awareness and 
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Transparency Around Lobbying  
 
58. Lobbying is an important and legitimate aspect of public life in a liberal democracy. 
The right of individuals, businesses and interest groups to make representations to 
government, and the need for government to discuss policy proposals with those who 
might be affected, is essential. As this Committee argued 8 years ago, "Free and 
open access to government is necessary for a functioning democracy as those who 
might be affected by decisions need the opportunity to present their case."26  
 
59. Lobbying undermines trust in the integrity of our democracy when it is associated 
with money, undue influence, and secrecy. The perception that preferential access is 
given to party donors, that ministerial decision-making can be influenced through gifts 
and hospitality, or that important policy decisions are made in secret consultations 
with vested interests, all serve to lower impressions of standards in public life.  
 
60. Such perceptions are preventable if all those in public life on the receiving end of 
lobbying - including ministers, civil servants and special advisers - act in the spirit of 
the Nolan Principles. Transparency, in particular, is vital in enabling the government 
to prove to citizens that it acts in accordance with the Seven Principles of Public Life. 
As the Committee wrote in its 2013 report, Strengthening Transparency Around 
Lobbying: 
 
"The need for greater transparency is a matter of perception and substance. 
The more that lobbying activity is hidden from public view, the more it will be 
seen as “murky” and the greater in fact will be the concerns about lobbying in 
general. Lobbying which is secret without good reason inhibits even-
handedness, results in distorted evidence and arguments, fuels suspicions, 
facilitates excessive hospitality, corruption and other impropriety, hides or 
clouds accountability, undermines trust and confidence in political processes, 
and is inconsistent with modern democratic standards."27 
 
61. In government, upholding transparency around lobbying is a matter of statutory 
regulation and codes of conduct. The 2014 Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party 
Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act established the Register of 
Consultant Lobbyists, overseen by a Registrar, to require multi-client lobbying 
agencies to disclose their clients. Government departments publish quarterly returns 
on gifts, hospitality, and external meetings of ministers, permanent secretaries, and 
special advisers (though only meetings with the media in the case of special 
advisers). Transparency obligations on ministers and special advisers are found in 
their respective codes of conduct. 
 
62. The current system of transparency around lobbying is not fit for purpose. 
Transparency matters not just for transparency's sake. Transparency matters to the 
extent that data released facilitates effective scrutiny and accountability. Despite 
significant improvements in the availability of government information over the past 
25 years, lobbying data published by government and the Registrar does not meet 
this requirement. Transparency International cite 26 lobbying scandals since 2010 
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where "critical information… was not captured either by the statutory lobbying 
register or departmental disclosures", and academic analysis that showed "major 
discrepancies" between reported ministerial meetings and the Register of Consultant 
Lobbyists.28  
 
63. The Committee believes that the primary responsibility for transparency around 
lobbying should rest with the lobbied. The obligations of open government should fall 
on the shoulders of ministers, special advisers and senior civil servants, rather than 
those making representations to them. The government's transparency output must 
enable the public to understand who is attempting to influence public policy and their 
connections to those taking decisions. 
  
64. This is not currently the case. It is too difficult to find out who is lobbying government, 
information is often released too late, descriptions of the content of government 
meetings are ambiguous and lack necessary detail, transparency data is scattered, 
disparate, and not easily cross-referenced, and information in the public interest is 
often excluded from data releases completely. Reforms are needed to the 
accessibility, quality, and timeliness of government data and to the scope of 
transparency rules. The rules and guidance on informal lobbying and alternative 
forms of communication also require improvement and greater clarity.  
 
Improving the Accessibility, Quality and Timeliness of Government Data Releases 
 
65. The Cabinet Office should collate all departmental transparency releases and publish 
them in an accessible, centrally managed and searchable database. Releases are 
currently published across different departmental web pages, as well as the Register, 
meaning that any attempt to obtain a clear picture of one company or organisation's 
attempts to influence government is difficult and time consuming. In the USA, 
Canada and Ireland, all lobbying activity is available in one place. The government 
should consider ways in which it can provide a similar single source of all 
transparency data, rather than leaving it to journalists and NGOs to collate multiple 
different data sources. With one government-maintained lobbying database, records 
would be more easily searchable, networks of influence easier to see, and 
discrepancies in the quality and timeliness of data released by departments would 
become more visible. Significant improvements in government capabilities in digital 
and data create an opportunity to build an important resource for open government.  
 
66. A centrally managed database would also provide better clarity on responsibility and 
accountability for poor-quality data releases. Currently, individual private offices have 
responsibility for collating quarterly returns and submitting them to the Cabinet Office 
"for sense checking".29 It is unclear what the consequences are, if any, if returns are 
incomplete or deficient. Ongoing cross-government work to highlight the importance 
of transparency and ensure consistent standards across private offices is welcome. 
However a system of meaningful oversight and accountability for the quality of 
departmental returns, run by the Cabinet Office as it publishes all returns centrally, is 
necessary. Compliance with the government's own transparency rules is an 
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important ethical responsibility, and should not be seen as a low priority 
administrative exercise.  
 
67. To improve the quality of transparency data, the government should ensure that a 
sufficient level of detail is provided on the subject matter of all lobbying meetings and 
any policy matters discussed. In some cases this is done already, and the Committee 
notes GRECO's assessment that "more information is now available on the content 
of meetings".30 However, transparency releases still too often describe meetings in 
ambiguous language and terms such as "regular catch up". When the subject matter 
is specified, this can still be too broad. Descriptions such as "To discuss Covid-19", 
"To discuss the Union", or "To discuss EU exit" do not provide the public with the 
minimum necessary information to understand what representations the government 
is receiving on a specific policy matter. In comparison, descriptions such as "To 
discuss access to public land for digital infrastructure rollout", "To discuss September 
schools announcement with vulnerable children stakeholders" and "To discuss BBC's 
plans for England around their announcement on regional cuts", all found in recent 
releases, all convey a suitable level of detail. 
 
68. Cabinet Office guidance from 2018, released under FOI, states that "Departments 
should make every effort to provide details on the purpose of the meeting" and that 
the term "‘General Discussion’ should not normally be used."31 This spirit of this 
guidance is not consistently followed and ambiguous meeting descriptions can be 
found in multiple recent transparency returns. The Cabinet Office should provide 
stricter guidelines on minimum standards for the descriptions of meetings and ensure 
compliance by government departments.  
 
69. The Cabinet Office should also ensure that all transparency releases are published in 
a timely manner. Under current practice, departments should publish data quarterly, 
up to three months after the end of the reporting period. Yet this deadline is often 
missed, with some departments on occasion taking up to a year to disclose 
meetings.32 Such delays undermine the purpose of the transparency release itself: 
without prompt publication, Parliament and the media cannot scrutinise the activity of 
government as it happens, and accountability delayed is too often accountability 
denied. The government should publish transparency returns monthly, rather than 
quarterly, in line with the MPs’ and Peers’ registers of interests. Publishing returns 
more regularly will help transparency become part of private offices' regular routine, 
rather than a one-off task which can be too easily delayed. 
 
Scope of Transparency Requirements for Senior Civil Servants and Special Advisers 
 
70. Departmental transparency releases do not consistently cover senior civil servants 
below permanent secretary level, meaning that the lobbying of deputy directors, 
directors, and directors general is not always disclosed. These are roles with 
significant authority, often with more direct responsibility for an area of government 
policy than the relevant minister or permanent secretary. In many cases, a company 
or organisation seeking to influence government policy is more likely to approach a 
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director or deputy director. The government should therefore publish meetings held 
with external organisations by senior civil servants below permanent secretary level.  
 
71. Quarterly transparency releases include details of special advisers' external meetings 
only if they are held with "newspaper and other media proprietors, editors and senior 
executives".33 Given the influence that many special advisers now hold, the 
government should publish the full diaries of special advisers’ external meetings. 
 
Informal Lobbying and Alternative Forms of Communication 
 
72. The Ministerial Code makes clear that if a minister "meets an external organisation or 
individual and finds themselves discussing official business without an official present 
. . . any significant content should be passed back to the department as soon as 
possible after the event."34 In recent evidence given to PACAC, the Cabinet 
Secretary made clear that the underpinning principle regarding any ministerial 
discussions with external individuals or organisations is that "government business is 
government business however it is conducted and by whatever means of 
communication."35  
 
73. Under this principle, any lobbying of ministers through informal channels or 
alternative technologies, such as WhatsApp or Zoom, should be reported to civil 
servants. This clarification is welcome, given that recent controversies have focused 
attention on the fact that significant attempts to lobby government can occur through 
private messages and phone calls, rather than formal face to face meetings. Updated 
guidance should make clear that WhatsApps, texts, Zooms, and any other informal 
lobbying should be reported back to officials, given that the only relevant guidance on 
alternative communications at present was published in 2013 and concerns the use 
of private email.36   
 
74. The implementation of the principle that 'government business is government 
business' will not, however, solve concerns about the transparency of informal 
lobbying. The Director General for Ethics and Propriety at the Cabinet Office made 
clear in recent evidence to PACAC that quarterly transparency releases do "not cover 
phone calls unless the phone call is in place of a meeting. It covers phone meetings, 
but it does not include routine phone calls or texts."37 For this reason, former Prime 
Minister David Cameron's extensive lobbying of ministers and officials on behalf of 
Greensill Capital in late 2020 was not included in any departmental disclosures.38  
 
75. It would be neither practical nor desirable for government to publish proactively 
details about all engagements with external bodies made by email, phone call or text, 
although all are subject to FOI. However, it is clear that the current categories of 
published information - gifts, overseas travel, hospitality and meetings - effectively 
exclude the disclosure of informal lobbying, which appears to be an increasingly 
common way for external organisations to attempt to influence government.  
 
76. It is both unreasonable and impractical to ask ministers to reject all informal 
approaches on policy matters, and so instead government should revise the 
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categories of published information to close the loophole by which informal lobbying 
is not disclosed in departmental releases. Either the 'meetings' category should be 
broadened or a fifth category should be added to include representations made to 
government by alternative means. Instant messaging applications, virtual meetings, 
phone calls and emails should be included in this category when the representations 
to government are serious, premeditated, and credible, or are given substantive 
consideration by ministers, special advisers or senior civil servants.  
 
The Committee's Findings:  
● To improve the quality of departmental transparency releases, the Cabinet Office 
should: 
○ collate all departmental transparency releases and publish them in one 
centrally managed database.  
○ ensure that a sufficient level of detail is provided on the subject matter of all 
lobbying meetings and any policy matters discussed 
○ ensure that all transparency releases are published in a timely manner on a 
monthly basis 
○ publish details of meetings held with external organisations by senior civil 
servants below permanent secretary level 
○ publish details of meetings held with external organisations by special 
advisers 
○ update guidance on the use of modern communications, to apply the 
principle that 'government business is government business' to any informal 
lobbying 
○ revise the categories of published information to close the loophole by 
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The Regulation of Public Appointments 
 
77. The Commissioner for Public Appointments was established on the recommendation 
of the Committee’s first report. Lord Nolan outlined the principles that guide public 
appointments to this day: that "ultimate responsibility for appointments should remain 
with Ministers", but that the appointments process "should be governed by the 
overriding principle of appointment by merit" and that ministers should be advised on 
appointments by "a panel or committee which includes an independent element".39 
 
78. These principles remain relevant and valid today. Many public appointments are to 
bodies which have a significant impact on the implementation of government policy. It 
is therefore right that ministers retain the ability to appoint candidates whom they 
believe will implement government policy in line with ministerial priorities. The 
Commissioner for Public Appointments, Peter Riddell, points out that the use of the 
term 'politicisation' is unhelpful in this regard. The public appointments process is 
inherently 'political'. Lord Nolan rejected proposals for a wholly independent 
appointments system and we see no reason to overturn that judgement.  
 
79. It is equally important to stress that the principle of ministerial patronage is tempered 
by the principle of appointment by merit. Ministers should not appoint unqualified or 
inexperienced candidates to important public roles. Such appointments feed public 
perceptions of cronyism and corruption and undermine public trust in the quality of 
public administration. In order to guarantee that the assessment of merit is fair and 
nonpartisan, it should be undertaken by a panel which includes a credible 
independent element.  
 
80. The fair assessment of candidates serves a second purpose: to improve and ensure 
diversity in public appointments. Public bodies should reflect the communities they 
serve. When appointments are made without any assessment of merit there is a 
tendency for like to appoint like and for diverse candidates who do not see 
themselves as 'fitting the mould' not to apply for roles. An independent assessment of 
candidates gives greater confidence to candidates from diverse backgrounds to put 
themselves forward and gives those candidates a greater chance of success.  
 
81. These principles - described by the Commissioner for Public Appointments as "either 
constrained open competition or constrained political patronage" - manifest 
themselves today in a process by which assessment panels produce a list of 
candidates who are deemed appointable, with the final decision left to ministers.40 
The process is defined in the government's Governance Code on Public 
Appointments, which is overseen by the Commissioner.  
 
82. Prior to the 2016 Grimstone Review, the Commissioner played a more active role in 
significant appointments.41 The Grimstone reforms replaced the Commissioner's 
independent assessors with Senior Independent Panel Members (SIPMs), who are 
appointed by departments after consultation with the Commissioner. To the 
disapproval of many, including the previous Commissioner, PACAC, and this 
Committee's predecessors, the Commissioner's role was transformed from an active 
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participant in the appointments process to an independent regulator of it. Fair and 
equal assessment by a panel against the job specification remains central to the 
Commissioner's oversight.  
 
83. The question for the Committee concerns whether current arrangements uphold the 
right degree of balance between ministerial patronage and appointment on merit. We 
agree with the Commissioner that the post-Grimstone system has generally worked 
well until now, but it is highly dependent on both the willingness of ministers to act 
with restraint and the preparedness of the Commissioner to speak out against 
breaches of the letter or the spirit of the Code.  
 
84. The Commissioner has warned that the precarious balance between ministerial 
patronage and appointment by merit "is under threat".42 Of particular concern to the 
Committee is the leaking of preferred candidates to the media, which may discourage 
suitable candidates from applying for posts, undermines the integrity of the system 
and weakens the public's perception of the independence of the regulatory process. 
As the issue of 'pre-briefing' shows, it is unlikely that a system so dependent on 
personal responsibility will be sustainable in the long term.  
 
85. In the case of significant appointments, reforms are necessary to ensure the 
Commissioner has sufficient powers to uphold the integrity of the process by which a 
list of appointable candidates is produced, from which ministers can make their 
choice. The Committee welcomes proposals by the Commissioner to strengthen the 
role and will consider these as part of our final report this autumn.43  
 
86. The Committee has also heard concerns about the growth of unregulated 
appointments, and the need to strengthen the appointments process for the heads of 
standards regulators. These are discussed below. 
 
Unregulated (Direct) Appointments 
 
87. Recent years have seen a considerable expansion in the number of direct 
appointments by ministers, which go through no regulatory process. A number of 
these appointments were made to Covid-related roles and had to be made with 
urgency. Former Cabinet Secretary Lord Sedwill told PACAC that unregulated 
appointments were a temporary response to the pandemic and not a precedent for 
future appointments.44 The Committee agrees with PACAC Chair William Wragg that 
should unregulated appointments become the norm, the role and remit of the 
Commissioner for Public Appointments would need to be reassessed.45   
 
88. The most concerning category of unregulated appointments are Non-Executive 
Directors (NEDs) of government departments. NEDs were introduced to provide 
better oversight and corporate governance of government departments, and the 2010 
Ministerial Code emphasised that NEDs should largely be drawn from the 
"commercial private sector".46 However there is an increasing trend amongst 
ministers to appoint supporters or political allies as NEDs. This both undermines the 
ability of NEDs to scrutinise the work of their departments, and has a knock-on effect 
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on the appointments process elsewhere, as NEDs are often used on the assessment 
panels for other public and senior civil service appointments. The appointment 
process for NEDs should be regulated. 
 
89. The Commissioner has also recommended that Government departments should 
publish a list of all unregulated appointments. The Committee agrees.  
 
Appointment of Standards Regulators and Watchdogs 
 
90. A final issue concerns the appointment of standards regulators whose role is to 
provide independent scrutiny of government. The appointments process for these 
roles, including the Chair of CSPL, ACOBA, the House of Lords Appointments 
Commission, the Commissioner for Public Appointments, and the Independent 
Adviser on Ministers' Interests, require a greater element of independence. The 
Commissioner has suggested that assessment panels for these roles could have a 
majority of lay members or the relevant Parliamentary Select Committee could have 
the power of veto. All the appointments listed above already have a pre- or post-
appointment hearing with the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs 
Committee (PACAC). The Committee will assess these options, and others, before 
making final recommendations this autumn. 
 
The Committee's Findings:  
● Reforms are necessary to the regulation of significant public appointments to 
ensure the Commissioner has sufficient powers to uphold the integrity of the 
appointments process. 
● The appointment process for Non-Executive Directors of government departments 
should be regulated. 
● Government departments should each publish a list of unregulated appointments. 
● The appointment process for standards regulators requires a greater element of 
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